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C R I M I N A L  L AW
Can the Federal Government Use the Generic Wire Fraud Statute to  
Prosecute Public Officials for Corrupt Activities That Are  
Conducted for Political Rather than Private Gain? 
CASE AT A GLANCE  
The defendants, two former New Jersey officials convicted in “Bridgegate,” challenge the scope of 
federal prosecutorial power under the generic wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. They argue that 
the government sidestepped the Court’s explicit prohibition on inquiries into an official’s real reasons 
for an official act, unless bribery or kickbacks are involved. The defendants urge the Court to foreclose 
the government from circumventing limitations on the honest-services fraud doctrine under McNally v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), and Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). The government 
argues that the defendants’ actions met all statutory elements without the jury having to assess their 
underlying political motives.
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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner and the United States agree that lies may be decisive 
in this case. How, why, and even which lies, however, are in 
dispute. Petitioner presents the Court with a broad question 
about the acceptability of the government’s parsing of motives 
to obtain a conviction. The government, on the other hand, sets 
out a workman-like question about whether it met the elements 
of the offense. Even though petitioner appeals all counts of her 
conviction, the argument centers largely on the wire fraud statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 1343.
ISSUE
Does petitioner’s action of redirecting public resources meet the 
requirements set out under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 that she exceeded her 
authority and deprived the state of its property? 
FACTS
The case arises from the 2013 New Jersey “Bridgegate” scandal. 
At the time petitioner Bridget Anne Kelly worked as deputy chief 
of staff for New Jersey’s Ofice of Intergovernmental Affairs and 
was largely responsible for organizing local government oficials in 
support of Governor Chris Christie. William E. Baroni Jr. served as 
deputy executive director (ED) of the Port Authority, an interstate 
governmental organization that oversees public transportation 
between New York and New Jersey, including the George 
Washington Bridge (GW). His chief of staff was David Wildstein. 
Baroni, whose interests align with Kelly’s, joined the case as 
respondent to not delay the brieing schedule. 
Despite having been courted by Governor Christie, in June 2013 
the mayor of Fort Lee, NJ, indicated that he would not support 
Christie in his re-election bid. In response, Kelly informed 
Wildstein and Baroni that it was “[t]ime for some trafic problems 
in Fort Lee.” 
The GW, the world’s busiest bridge, has 13 lanes and tollbooths 
at the entrance ramp from Fort Lee; 3 booths are dedicated to 
entry from Fort Lee. Kelly, Wildstein, and Baroni agreed that 
Baroni, in his role as deputy ED, should reallocate two of the 
three lanes from Fort Lee so as to be available for general use. 
Since only one lane would be open to Fort Lee trafic, Baroni and 
Wildstein authorized hiring a backup tollbooth operator to keep 
the single lane open at all times. To justify the lane changes to 
Port Authority staff, Wildstein invented a trafic study. Some staff 
time was allocated to the phony study, and Port Authority staff 
collected some data.
The reallocation was to go in effect on Monday, September 
9, 2013, the irst day of the new school year. In contrast to 
Port Authority operating procedures, Baroni and Wildstein 
intentionally withheld information about the change from local 
authorities and the Port Authority’s executive director, Patrick 
Foye. Yet, both told Port Authority staff that Foye supported the 
changes.
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Trafic in Fort Lee quickly ground to a halt that Monday, presenting 
safety and security hazards. When the ED learned of the closure 
later that week, he immediately reversed the lane realignment. 
Once the political background to “Bridgegate” became apparent, 
Governor Christie dismissed all three involved. He could never 
shake the political stain either.
In 2015, Kelly and Baroni were charged with conspiracies to 
commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1343 and federal 
program fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 666(a)(1)(A), and 
to violate civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the underlying 
substantive crimes of wire fraud, federal program fraud, and 
deprivation of civil rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242. 
The government’s theory of the case was that defendants had 
conspired to fraudulently use Port Authority resources and 
property. Wildstein pled guilty to two counts and cooperated with 
the government.
A jury convicted both defendants on all counts. The district court 
originally sentenced Kelly to 18 months and Baroni to 24 months 
in prison, each with one year of supervised release to follow. The 
Third Circuit, 909 F.3d 550 (3rd Cir. 2018), petition for rehearing 
denied (Feb. 5, 2019), vacated the civil rights convictions but 
afirmed all other counts. At resentencing, the judge shortened 
Kelly’s and Baroni’s prison terms by 5 and 6 months, respectively. 
After the petition for rehearing was denied, Kelly iled for a writ 
of certiorari. Baroni, who had not requested rehearing, iled 
in support of Kelly’s brief. When the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, Baroni joined as respondent so that any decision the 
Court renders will impact him directly.
CASE ANALYSIS
Petitioner argues that she was convicted of “an otherwise-
legitimate oficial act” because she concealed her political 
motive—to punish the mayor of Fort Lee for his refusal to 
support the governor. The lower court decisions must be wrong 
as they assessed the defendants’ true political reasons rather 
than adhering to their stated policy grounds in violation of 
Supreme Court precedent.
Baroni argues that “Bridgegate is a case of bareknuckle New 
Jersey politics, not graft,” for which all paid a political price. The 
federal government’s prosecution here overreached. According 
to Baroni, the government circumvented the Supreme Court’s 
limitations on use of the “honest services” doctrine set out in 
Skilling and McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
The federal wire fraud statute requires three crucial elements 
to be met. First, petitioner argues oficials empowered to make 
decisions on behalf of the state may breach their iduciary duty 
if using “bad” or deceitful reasons but do not incur criminal 
liability. Since Baroni effectively represented the victim—the 
Port Authority—he could not have deceived it even when his 
given rationale was pretextual. The defendants argue Baroni was 
authorized to act on behalf of the Port Authority without giving 
any rationale. He and the ED each could issue decisions the other 
could not override. Any lie about his true motive was therefore 
irrelevant. 
Petitioner and respondent also note that a narrow argument about 
inal decision-makers is generally misleading as there is almost 
never an ultimate authority. In addition, they point to the anomaly 
that it would be the most powerful elected and appointed oficials 
who would escape liability under the government’s approach. 
In response, the United States notes that in most organizations, 
the question of who has inal authority is clearly delineated. That 
is not true for the Port Authority, which appears to operate without 
written policies and procedures. The issue of whether Baroni 
exercised ultimate decision-making authority was therefore 
correctly left to the jury, which found against him. Based on the 
evidence, which included Baroni and Wildstein lying about the 
ED’s assent to the realignment and his immediate reversal of the 
trafic change once he found out about it, a rational jury could ind 
in the government’s favor. 
Baroni’s pretense of the nonexistent trafic study was not at issue 
legally but served to indicate his lack of ultimate authority. That 
turned his action into “unauthorized commandeering of Port 
Authority resources,” bringing it within purview of the fraud 
statute, the government argues. 
As to the second condition, petitioner argues the lower level courts 
misconstrued the meaning of “property” under the fraud statute. 
Two types of property are at issue though there is disagreement 
as to which of these deinitions may be properly before the 
Court. One is the lost wages of Port Authority staff recruited to 
participate in the phony trafic study, Baroni and Wildstein’s time, 
and the additional expense for the second tollbooth collector. The 
Third Circuit based its decision largely on the lost labor of public 
employees. The other deinitional question, merely lagged by the 
Third Circuit, pertains to the Port Authority’s “right to control” the 
exclusive operation of the GW. 
Petitioner argues that since the underlying decision to realign 
lanes was not fraudulent, it cannot amount to fraud to use 
the resources to implement such decision. After all, the costs 
attendant to the realignment were solely incidental and not the 
object of the scheme to defraud. 
Petitioner also claims that “intangible rights of allocation, 
exclusion, and control” do not it the deinition of “property” under 
the fraud statute. The Port Authority’s regulatory decision-making 
power over the bridge is not a property interest but rather part of 
a state’s sovereign power to regulate akin to the state licenses in 
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
The government notes Kelly and Baroni procured the labor of 
public employees, which included both staff and Baroni and 
Wildstein’s time, under false or fraudulent pretenses. Because 
they deprived the Port Authority of its money, the Third Circuit 
did not need to decide whether they also ran afoul of the “right to 
control,” though the court found suficient evidence to that effect. 
As the lanes and tollbooths on the GW generate revenue, the 
Port Authority has not only a purely regulatory but also property 
interests in the exclusive operation of the bridge.
The third condition, in fraud, a lie is only actionable if it pertains 
to the essential terms of a transaction that deprive a party of the 
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beneit of the bargain. According to petitioner, a motive for an 
action is not an essential part of the bargain. Any discussion about 
the defendant’s motive therefore threatens to criminalize politics. 
After all, in fraud statutes the alleged offender’s objective decision 
rather than their subjective motive is at issue. 
The cover story about the trafic study, the government claims, was 
a “material” falsehood because reasonable persons would attach 
importance to it in determining their action. Baroni could only 
accomplish “by trick” the object of the scheme—control over the 
bridge and employee time and labor. Without that false statement, 
he would have never been able to commandeer Port Authority 
resources. 
The government notes that the underlying political motive was not 
at issue in determining whether an offense occurred. It was raised 
at trial only to provide the jury with a coherent explanation as to 
why the offense occurred at all.
Petitioner charges the government with contravening the Supreme 
Court’s carefully constructed limitations on the “honest services” 
doctrine, as set out in McNally, Skilling, and McDonnell. Honest 
services fraud is limited to bribery or kickbacks where an oficial 
action furthers undisclosed personal interests while purporting 
to advance a public interest. If the wire fraud statute were applied 
as the government proposes, Baroni argues, it would thwart the 
limitations the Court imposed on the “honest services” doctrine. 
In contravention of precedent, the United States uses federal 
fraud statutes to set out good government requirements for local 
oficials. That raises serious questions of federalism. In addition, 
the government’s theory criminalizes a wide range of political 
activity not only in local but also in national politics whenever 
questions of motive are raised. These issues should be resolved 
at the ballot box rather than in the courtroom, the Court noted in 
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
The government rejects the notion that this is an honest services 
fraud case in disguise but rather that it simply involved money and 
property fraud. Kelly and Baroni’s political motive was ultimately 
irrelevant; only their mens rea mattered. The material lies at issue 
did not pertain to the goal of the lane realignment but rather to the 
existence of the trafic study. It was that lie that allowed Baroni to 
misappropriate Port Authority resources.
The contravention of the Supreme Court’s mandate is not the only 
objectionable feature of the government’s approach, according to 
petitioner and respondent. The government’s theory of the case 
also violates every canon of construction. Its parsing of an oficial’s 
true motive will cast a pall over every local government decision 
and will allow federal prosecutors to become roving ambassadors 
of good government, leaving in their wake countless random and 
perhaps partisan-based criminal convictions. Baroni states that 
such interpretation of the statute “injects a potent new weapon 
into a highly charged, hyper-partisan political environment in 
which voices on both sides are already regularly clamoring for 
their rivals to be prosecuted.” The vagueness of the statute allows 
prosecutors and judges, rather than the legislature, to deine 
crimes and will lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
It raises fair notice concerns and at a minimum demands 
application of the doctrine of lenity.
Three amici weigh in on Kelly’s side. Lord Conrad Black and 
Governor Robert F. McDonnell, who both saw the Supreme Court 
overturn their convictions, consider the government’s action 
an end run around the limitations imposed in their cases and a 
testament to governmental overreach facilitated by the vast array 
of federal criminal statutes.
Two other amici weigh in on the control theory and the property 
deinition, respectively. The National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers argues that neither state government functions 
nor regulatory actions can be “property” for purposes of the wire 
fraud statute without nullifying the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cleveland. If the government is permitted to consider the right 
to regulate trafic on the GW Bridge as property, that statute will 
become unbounded. 
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse iles the sole amicus brief on behalf 
of the government, asking the Court essentially to stay out of 
the political process and respect the jury’s verdict to prevent the 
further corruption of the political process. 
SIGNIFICANCE
Petitioner and respondent style this case as the next chapter 
in the line of decisions from McNally to McDonnell that reign 
in governmental prosecutions in cases of public (and private) 
“corruption.” Accordingly, they charge the government with 
prosecutorial overreach, with subverting the Court’s prior 
limitations, and with the criminalization of merely political 
actions. The government attempts to dial down the stakes. 
The full facts raise questions as to whether this case presents 
the correct vehicle for further restriction on public corruption 
prosecutions. Petitioner and respondent win the competition of 
rhetorical lourish and memorable lines, but two of the pivotal 
questions—Baroni’s authority and the status of the trafic study—
seem to have been allocated correctly to the jury, with the evidence 
adduced meeting at least a suficiency standard.
Despite the facts’ shortcomings and the government’s attempt to 
avoid a broad ruling, most commentators expect the Court to use 
the case as an opportunity to further limit federal prosecutions 
of local oficials in cases involving corrupt conduct that does not 
directly beneit the involved inancially. That may serve well those 
who fear the breadth of criminal statutes and federal prosecutions. 
The concept of “property” the United States proposes might 
provide the easiest hook, especially as the government cites 
Baroni and Wildstein’s time expended in the plot as basis for the 
loss involved.
One can safely assume that the defendants here never expected 
a criminal prosecution, which raises notice concerns. Still, the 
stakes and the actions seem qualitatively different from those in 
the earlier cases petitioner cites. 
In the end, Senator Whitehouse’s amicus brief may have hit 
a nerve in his invocation of jury sensibilities to actionable 
“corruption.” Still it is upon Congress to draft statutes that provide 
notice and bounded deinitions of criminality.
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